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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and JAMES F. 
TAYLOR, and UNITED PARK 
CITY MINES COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10219 
This case calls for the Supreme Court of Utah 
to review the Industrial Commission's proceedings 
and decision awarding benefits to James F. Taylor 
under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law, for the purpose of determining whether the 
Commission exceeded its powers in making such 
award, and whether the Commission's findings of 
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fact are supported by substantial, competent evi-
dence having probative value. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
James F. Taylor filed an Occupational Disease 
Claim of Employee with the Industrial Commission 
dated May 9, 1962. On August 6, 1963, pursuant to 
Order and Notice the Industrial Commission held a 
hearing on the application. Thereafter, pursuant 
to a Motion for Supplemental Hearing (R48, 49), 
the Commission issued its Order granting the said 
Motion ( R50), and by said Order gave notice to the 
State Insurance Fund that it might desire to present 
evidence upon the issue of its liability as carrier. 
Thereafter, an order setting the time and place for 
the further hearing (R-51) was made and entered 
setting the time .for the second hearing on the 30th 
day of December, 1963 at 11:00 a.m. The hearing 
was held on that date. On June 15, 1964 the Com-
mission rendered its decision and order in which it 
was found that James F. Taylor was 1001o disabled 
because of silicosis based upon the disabling effects 
of silicosis and that he was entitled to have the 
United Park City Mines Company and the State 
Insurance Fund pay him $15,415.00 compensation 
benefits at the rate of $41.75 per week beginning 
February 9, 1963 and continuing until a total of 
$15,415.00 has been paid, together with medical and 
hospital benefits. The order also required the State 
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Insurance Fund to pay the said benefits as the in-
surance carrier for the United Park City Mines 
Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PETITION 
The Plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, in 
this review of proceedings seeks to have the Supreme 
Court reverse, vacate and annuli the award which 
the Industrial Commission made to James F. Taylor 
insofar as it relates to the liability of the State In-
surance Fund to pay the benefits as set forth in the 
Order above described. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
James F. Taylor commenced working as a 
miner in 1925 ( R-56) . He left actual underground 
work for the Silver King Mine "around in the '40s 
or '39, I think." (R-57). He was employed as a sur-
face watchman between January 31, 1939 to July 
1, 1950, and again between July 16, 1950 and August 
15, 1952, and from October 22, 1954 to June 30, 
1961. The last time he worked as a watchman it 
was for seven days only from February 3, 1962 to 
February 8, 1962. All of this period of time his em-
ployment was that of a surface watchman (R-116). 
The record is clear that at least since 1941, he had 
not been employed in underground mining. (R-61) 
The last seven days of employment was that 
of a night watchman when he filled in for Moon 
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Q. So you noted that you had a definite 
shortness of breath at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were unable in fact to carry 
on work as an underground miner at that 
time? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did you have any trouble with arth-
ritis at that time? 
A. Well, I had it, but I would always go 
to work. 
Q. And did that condition - shortness 
of breath, and tendency to fatigue- become 
worse, or was it a fairly static condition? 
A. It became worse at times. 
Q. As time went on, it became worse? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you say that by the time you 
went to work for the Daly Judge Mine, it 
had gotten about as bad as it got? 
A. Well, it got a little worse after the 
last years there. 
Q. The last year or two? 
A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.) 
Q. But it was very difficult for you to 
carry on the work during the last, oh, from 
1959 on; is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
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Q. Did you go to a doctor about this con-
dition at all? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did you consult about it? 
A. Well, here a while back - last win-
ter - I went to Dr. Barta first. He told me 
I had silicosis. 
Q. When did you first consult him? 
A. That was around '33, I think it was. 
Something like that. 
Q. Dr. Barta, back in 1933, told you 
that you had silicosis? 
A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.) 
Q. And what other doctors did you con-
sult, in order of the time that you consulted 
them, about your condition? 
A. I went to Dr. Onike when I went to 
work for United Park. He told me I had sili-
. 
COS IS. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. 1952. I went to Dr. Openshaw here, 
and he told me I had silicosis, too. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. I think that was about '43 or '44. 
Somewhere around there, I think. 
Q. Did these gentlemen suggest to you 
that you ought not to continue to work in the 
mines? 
A. That's right. Dr. Openshaw sure did. 
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It may be claimed that Applicant's cause of 
action did not arise until he became disabled and 
unable to work as alleged, however, Section 35-2-56 
provides for permanent partial disability from oc-
cupational disease. Certainly it cannot be said that 
Mr. Taylor was not partially disabled by reason of 
the disease as it was impossible for him to work 
underground, and he was advised that he ought not 
to continue working in the mine. Dr. Openshaw 
and Dr. Onike told him he had silicosis and that he 
should not continue to work in the mine (R-82, 83). 
It was very difficult for him to carry on work from 
1959 on. This question was asked of Mr. Taylor and 
he advised that that was right. (R-82) 
The provisions of Section 35-2-56 which pro-
vide for the payment of permanent partial disability 
compensation for occupational diseases was incor-
porated in the law in 1949. It cannot be said that 
the Applicant after that date did not have ample 
opportunity to properly present his claim for per-
manent partial disability due to silicosis. It also ap-
pears abundantly clear that under the provisions of 
the limitation statute above set forth that his claim 
should have been presented at least within one year 
following 1952 when he was told by Dr. Onike that 
he had silicosis, and that he ought not to continue 
to work in the mines. 
Although we do not have a Utah silicosis case 
which involves the above-mentioned limitations stat-
ute, we do have a Utah case involving an occupa-
tional disease which does interpret the section. 
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In the case of State Insurance Fund v. Indus-
trial Commission, et al., 116 U. 279, 209 P. 2d. 558, 
this Court carefully considered the provisions of 
Section 35-2-48, U.C.A., 1953, which at that time 
was known as Section 42-1a-49, U.C.A., 1943. 
In that case Elbert I. Lunnen laid off from his 
work as a welder in a foundry after twenty-two 
years of employment. He was almost continuously 
exposed to harmful fumes. During the last five 
or six years of his employment he suffered from 
shortness of breath. During the time he was em-
ployed he repeatedly called his condition to the at-
tention of his employer and on occasions he was off 
work from three to eight days at a time. 
He was laid off from his employment on Febru-
ary 8th at which time he considered his disability 
to be only temporary, but he believed that it was 
due to his exposure to harmful fumes during his 
employment. He was aware of the fact that his dis-
ability might be compensable under the Act because 
he visited the Industrial Commission. His first doc-
tor apparently did not realize the seriousness of his 
condition, but his second doctor advised him that his 
disability was total and permanent and that it was 
compensable under our Act. 
This case was not a silicosis case, but it was 
based upon a disease other than silicosis, which re-
quired the written claim to be filed within sixty 
days after the cause of action arose. This Court 
said in construing the above-mentioned statute 
the following, at Page 283, Utah Reports: 
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The better rule which is in accord with 
reason and justice, is that a cause of ac-
tion does not arise until an ascertainable 
disability and compensable disability results. 
This is the rule adopted in California. See 
Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
*** . 
And again at Page 284, Utah reports: 
The cause of action arises in this kind 
of a case when the employee suffers com-
pensable disability under the act and could 
by reasonable diligence ascertain that his 
disability was employment caused and by its 
nature compensable. That ignorance of the 
requirements of the law does not postpone 
the accrual of a cause of action. 
And again on Page 285, Utah reports : 
But if, on account of his own failure to 
press his case, or have a complete examina-
tion made under circumstances which would 
reasonably put him on notice that he was 
probably entitled to compensation, he failed 
to discover that his disability was compens-
able, then the fault is his own and he cannot 
recover. 
On Page 286, Utah Reports, Justice Wolf in 
writing a concurring opinion, had this to say: 
Such holding does not permit the em-
ployee, by failing to demand payment, to 
postpone the accrual of the cause of action 
indefinitely, nor does it in the case where one 
of several successive employers may be liable, 
permit the cause of action to arise before it 
can be ascertained which employer is liable. 
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There are numerous cases from other juris-
dictions which are helpful and have discussed the 
question as to when the statute of limitations com-
mences to run. 
The California doctrine is that for the pur-
poses of the limitation statute, the "injury" set 
forth in the compensation statute occurred when the 
accumulated effects culminate in a disability trace-
able to the latent disease as a primary cause and in 
those cases whereby the exercise of reasonable care 
and diligence by the Applicant it is discoverable 
and apparent that a compensable injury has oc-
curred or has been sustained. 
See Marsh vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 
217 Cal. 338, 18 P. 2d. 933, 86 ALR 563. 
In this case three separate matters were con-
solidated for consideration. In the Court's opinion 
at Page 938, 18 P. 2d. is the following: 
From our study of the subject we are 
brought to the conclusion that in the case 
of a latent and progressive disease, such as 
pneumoconiosis, it cannot reasonably be said 
that the injury dates necessarily from the 
last day of exposure to a dust-laden atmos-
phere and that the prescriptive period begins 
to run from that date. Rather, according to 
our view, should the date of the injury be 
deemed the time when the accumulated ef-
fects culminate in a disability traceable to 
the latent disease as a primary cause, and by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence 
it is discoverable and apparent that a com-
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pensable injury was sustained in perfor-
mance of the duties of the employment. (Em-
phasis ours) 
In the Marsh case the Court, in reaching its 
conclusion, fixed the beginning of the running of 
the limitation statue as of the date the deceased 
was first disabled from work. The Court held that 
there should be further proceedings to ascertain 
when the statute of limitations had begun to run 
in conformance with the rule above set forth. 
This California rule was again stated in State 
of California, Subsequent Injuries Fund, Petitioner 
v. Industrial Accident Commission of the State of 
California, 304 P. 2d. 112 at Page 114, where the 
Court said: 
The date of injury in cases of occupa-
tional disease is that date upon which the 
employee first suffered disability therefrom, 
and either knew, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have known, that 
that disability was caused by his present or 
prior employment. 
In Hutchinson v. Semler, 361 P. 2d. 803, 227 
Ore. 437 decided May 10, 1961, rehearing denied 
June 14, 1961, 362 P. 2d. 704, the Court said at 
Page 807, 361 P. 2d.: 
In it he mentioned developments in the 
operation of the defendant's laboratory which 
he said caused the dust condition of the room 
in which he worked to become acute. He re· 
lated the efforts which he then made to per-
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suade the defendant to provide better ventila-
tion. That occurred in the first part of '56, 
so he swore. He also described the illness 
which came upon him and the manner in 
which his health deteriorated. He dwelled 
upon the fact that his lungs became effected 
and declared that 'My breathing was very 
bad.' Shortly he found himself engaged in 
coughing. According to him he felt 'run-
down, weak condition.' '***I thought maybe 
that I was tired and run-down and worn-out.' 
He added that, "If I walked two or three 
blocks at a normal rate I would be winded.' 
He attributed his ill health to the dust which 
he said was in the air of the room where he 
worked. He swore that the air in the room 
at times became so laden with dust that he 
could not see the walls and was compelled to 
withdraw to a nearby hallway until the dust 
had settled. 
When the plaintiff was asked to specify 
the time when he noticed his symptoms of ill 
health, he replied with expressions that lend 
themselves to more than one signification of 
time. According to him, he noticed his ill 
health, 'I'd say three, three and a half years' 
from the time that he entered the defendant's 
employ which he stated occurred in 'the spring 
of 1953'. 
In deciding that the judgment of the Circuit 
Court was affirmed which held that the statute 
of limitations began to run when the plaintiff be-
came aware of accumulated effects of the harmful 
dust, the Court stated the following: 
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We concur in the rule enunciated in the 
Urie case and believe that our prior decisions 
are in accord with it. Thus, the statute of 
limitations began to run in the case at bar 
when the Plaintiff became apprised, or as a 
reasonable man should have known, that his 
health was being undermined by the dust he 
was breathing. 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Taylor in the 
case now before the Court, testified to similar con-
ditions and that he had similar ailments as those 
claimed by the Applicant in Hutchinson vs. Semler 
(supra). 
The Wisconsin case of Universal Granite Quar-
ries Companies vs. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis. 
680, 272 N.W. 863, held that the failure of the 
Applicant to make a claim for compensation "with-
in two years from the time when he became aware 
of his condition, and the cause of it" barred his 
claim. 
Mr. Taylor cannot be heard to say that he was 
not aware of his condition nor that he was some-
what disabled when he testified that commencing in 
1941 he no longer worked underground and that 
he worked on the surface because he was having 
difficulty. (R-80) He also testified that he knew 
that he had silicosis because he had been told on 
more than one occasion, by his examining and at-
tending doctors, that he had this disease. (R-82 83) 
Certainly the statute of limitations should be held 
to have run. He had the right to file a claim for 
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silicosis under the partial disability act at any time 
after that act went into effect. Certainly it can-
not be said that Mr. Taylor was not partially dis-
abled because he was unable to perform his regular 
duties and had to take jobs which entailed some-
thing other than underground mining. 
We submit that Defendant Taylor, knew, years 
ago that he had silicosis and that as a result thereof 
he had disability, and that therefore his claim should 
be held to be barred. 
Point 2 
JAMES F. TAYLOR WAS NOT EXPOSED 
TO HARMFUL EMPLOYMENT DURING 
A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE 
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND BECAME 
EFFECTIVE. 
We do not in presenting this point, agree that 
James F. Taylor was, at any time during the period 
that he worked for the United Park City Mines 
Company after the policy of insurance issued to 
the United Park City Mines Company by the State 
Insurance Fund went into effect, exposed to a harm-
ful quantity of silicon dioxide dust. 
As hereinbefore set forth the United Park City 
Mines Company was self-insured until December 1, 
1961. Following this date the State Insurance 
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to the date incapacity began. See Inre John-
son, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735, Case of 
Bergeron, 243 Mass. 366, 137 N. E. 739; 
Case of Johnson, 279 Mass. 481, 181 N. E. 
761. Where, in the case of a cumulative 
cause of injury there has been a change of 
insurer, it has been deemed essential that the 
employee, in order to establish the liability 
of the later insurer to pay compensation, 
prove the existence of a causal relation be-
tween the employment during the period 
covered by its policy and the employee's in-
jury. Case of Fabrizio, 27 4 Mass. 352, 17 4 
N. E. 720; Case of Langford, 278 Mass. 461, 
463, 180. N. E. 228; Case of De Filippo, 284 
Mass. 531, 534, ( 188 N. E. 245). The im-
plication is that where no such causal relation 
exists the employee's injury which results in 
his incapacity is to be regarded as having oc-
curred prior to that period and not at the date 
incapacity began. 
In the very recent case of The State Insurance 
Fund v. The Industrial Commission et al case No. 
10095 this Court in discussing the above-quoted 
section pointed out that the statute requires em-
ployment throughout a 30-day period and harmful 
exposure during that period of 30-day employment. 
This Court said : 
This provision does not require that the 
employee actually work each day of the 30-
day period, nor that he be harmfully exposed 
each day of such period, it only requires 
harmful exposure and employment "during 
a period of 30 days." It would be very un-
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usual to have 30 working days or 30 days of 
harmful exposure during such a period. The 
obvious meaning of this statute is that it re-
quires employment throughout this period 
and also harmful exposure during the period 
but does not require actual working or actual 
exposure each day of such period. 
We submit that the decision in the above-cited 
case is controlling in this case in that Taylor was 
not employed during 30-days after the policy of 
The State Insurance Fund became effective. He was 
in fact employed for only a seven-day period, all 
of the days being in succession. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and 
order of the Industrial Commission insofar as it 
relates to The State Insurance Fund, should be 
annulled. 
'Respectfully submitted, 
Charles Welch, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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